Boise State University

ScholarWorks
Political Science Faculty Publications and
Presentations

Political Science Program

9-2020

Grand Old (Tailgate) Party?: Partisan Discrimination in Apolitical
Settings
Andrew M. Engelhardt
Vanderbilt University

Stephen M. Utych
Boise State University

This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Political Behavior. The final authenticated
version is available online at https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-018-09519-4. The content of this document may vary
from the final published version.

This is an author-produced, peer-reviewed version of this article. The final, definitive version of this document can be found online at Political
Behavior, published by Springer. Copyright restrictions may apply. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-018-09519-4

Grand Old (Tailgate) Party?:
Partisan Discrimination in Apolitical Settings1
Andrew M. Engelhardt
PhD Candidate
Vanderbilt University
Nashville, TN
andrew.m.engelhardt@vanderbilt.edu
ORCID: 0000-0003-2516-3394
Stephen M. Utych
Assistant Professor
Boise State University
Boise, ID
stephenutych@boisestate.edu
Recent work in political science demonstrates that the American public is strongly divided on
partisan lines. Levels of affective polarization are so great, it seems, that partisanship even
shapes behavior in apolitical settings. However, this literature does not account for other salient
identity dimensions on which people make decisions in apolitical settings, potentially stacking
the deck in favor of partisanship. We address this limitation with a pair of experiments studying
price discrimination among college football fans. We find that partisan discrimination exists,
even when the decision context explicitly calls attention to another social identity. But,
importantly, this appears to function mostly as in-group favoritism rather than out-group
hostility.
Mass partisans deeply detest each other (Pew Research Center 2016, Mason 2018), so much so that they discriminate
against one another in a variety of settings (Iyengar and Westwood 2015; Lelkes and Westwood 2017; McConnell et
al. 2018). While presenting compelling evidence that partisan animus, including interpersonal discrimination based
on partisanship, exists, this research contains an important limitation: by not considering partisanship’s influence
against other potentially salient identities it is difficult to assess the relative power of partisan based discrimination.
The social identity theory (SIT) and social categorization theory (SCT) literature this work builds on teaches us that
individuals possess multiple identities (e.g., Brewer 1999; Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje 2002; Roccas and Brewer
2002). People are all partisans of some stripe, but they also have gender, occupational, religious, and racial identities,
to name but a few. Furthermore, the context someone finds herself in dictates which of these many identities guide
her decision-making (Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje 2002; Chandra 2012). Consequently, accounting for individuals’
myriad social identities and the influence of context is an essential requirement for understanding the contours of
partisan discrimination. While existing designs allow for discrimination on other bases, the tasks do not create a
context where individuals are focusing on concerns separate from partisanship, potentially biasing in favor of finding
support for partisan discrimination.
We test the limits of partisan discrimination by focusing on a setting explicitly privileging another group identity over
partisanship: college football. One’s attachment to their favorite college football team is often quite strong (Cialdini
et al. 1974; Wann 2006; Tyler and Cobbs 2016), and decisions about sporting events should be plainly irrelevant to
politics. Even so, in two experiments we demonstrate that partisanship still guides behavior even when the context
raises another identity’s salience and decisions do not involve politics. Individuals are more likely to sell a hypothetical
football ticket to co-partisans and are more willing to accept a lower price for this ticket from co-partisans. Further,
these effects rival, or even surpass, the effects of team attachment, an identity that should be most relevant to the task
at hand given the decision-making context. The results suggest that the positive in-group sentiment partisanship fosters
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can displace the negative feelings created by someone supporting the wrong football team. Our results contribute to
the discussion on partisan discrimination by demonstrating that partisanship shapes apolitical decisions even when
paired with an identity that theory suggests should be more central to preferences in a particular apolitical setting.
The Spillover of Party-Centric Politics
Partisanship has long been viewed as one of, if not the most, consequential political predispositions (Campbell et al.
1960), and evidence suggests that its importance has only increased (Azari and Hetherington 2016; Smidt 2017). This
increased importance has given rise to what scholars alternatively call affective polarization (Iyengar, Sood, and
Lelkes 2012; Iyengar and Westwood 2015), social polarization (Mason 2013, 2015, 2018), or negative partisanship
(Abramowitz and Webster 2016). Individuals’ partisan attachments produce cognitive and affective biases that
engender intergroup conflict (Tajfel and Turner 1979), producing increasingly negative views of out-party members
(Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012; Abramowitz and Webster 2016) and feelings of anger toward out-party presidential
candidates (Mason 2013). These biases are so pervasive that partisanship even appears to influence judgments in
ostensibly apolitical domains. Individuals increasingly oppose a relative marrying a non-copartisan (Iyengar, Sood,
and Lelkes 2012), with these intergroup attitudes grounded in partisanship now perhaps rivaling or surpassing racial
biases (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012; Iyengar and Westwood 2015).
While interesting and important for understanding a socially sorted politics, these biases are also surprising. The social
identity theory literature this work builds on demonstrates that context establishes the connection between identity
and behavior (Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje 2002). From this perspective, partisanship seems most relevant for
decisions and evaluations with some political flavor due to its political underpinnings. That partisanship shapes vote
choice and evaluations of political figures should be expected. But the importance of contextual relevance makes the
evidence that partisanship also shapes decisions on things without clear political relevance, decisions where this
political identity is likely less salient, puzzling.
Although persuasive, important, and continuing to accumulate, evidence for partisan discrimination in apolitical areas
is limited because it does not conclusively demonstrate that partisanship matters more than the social identities that
should be relevant in a given situation. Iyengar and colleagues’ work generally does not present situations that allow
for untangling whether partisanship matters more than other dimensions for explaining behaviors, just that partisans’
biases meet or exceed those found in other domains (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012; Iyengar and Westwood 2015).
Similarly, an investigation into “the limits of partisan prejudice” focused on contexts privileging partisanship as an
identity (Lelkes and Westwood 2017). One included study does offer various potentially identity-based dimensions
on which to exclude someone from a group task, but none rival partisanship’s alleged intensity (see also McConnell
et al. 2018). The clearest evidence that context matters for partisan discrimination comes from outside the United
States. Michelitch (2015) examines how electoral proximity conditions the amount of partisan and ethnic
discrimination in concert in sub-Saharan Africa, though in this region ethnic and partisan identities are often highly
correlated. It remains to be seen whether, when placed in an apolitical context that makes another identity more salient,
partisan discrimination still manifests.
Not directly engaging with context matters because individuals possess multiple social identities that can guide
attitudes and behaviors. These sets of identities, or identity repertoires, consist of the groups with which people
perceive some common attachment (Chandra 2012). Context then leads individuals to privilege a given identity over
others (Brewer 1999; Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje 2002) in a process akin to priming (Taber and Young 2013).
Voting, or thinking about politics more generally, promotes thinking in partisan terms. Sitting in a church, synagogue,
or mosque privileges religious identities. Watching a sporting event makes one’s sporting allegiances salient.
Untangling which identity motivates attitudes and behaviors helps shed light on when and how it has influence, and
how this relates to other identities. Partisanship may matter, but this effect must be compared to the influence of other
identities a given context makes salient.
Context and identity repertoires may work in at least two ways that shed light on the depth of partisan animus. A
context may require judgments on apolitical outcomes with the decision privileging an identity other than party,
thereby removing partisanship’s relevance and eliminating partisan discrimination. Or partisanship may work in
concert with the salient identity dimension. The context may introduce cross-cutting identities that result in less
polarized intergroup attitudes and behaviors or it features reinforcing identities that lead to more polarized intergroup
interactions (Hewstone, Islam, and Judd, 1993; Mullen, Migdal, and Hewstone, 2001). In this way, context may
mitigate, or exacerbate, partisan biases even if the decision or judgment is politically relevant (Mason 2016, 2018).
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While existing designs do offer other bases for discrimination, they do not present tasks that clearly raise the salience
of other identities or they focus on political decisions, a context potentially privileging partisanship as an identity and
biasing in favor of finding support for partisan discrimination.
These insights suggest that partisan discrimination should be less likely in contexts that uniquely encourage thinking
about oneself on other identity-related terms orthogonal to politics. In these scenarios, the context focuses attention
on intergroup conflict along a dimension separate from politics. This should be especially likely when the alternative
identity is similarly contentious, motivating discrimination along the lines of that identity rather than partisanship.
However, with affective polarization continuing to increase (Iyengar and Krupenkin 2018), partisan discrimination
may still occur, even when another, more relevant identity upon which to discriminate is available.
Partisan Discrimination in a Contentious Apolitical Setting
To evaluate whether partisan discrimination occurs in apolitical settings we turn to a context at times potentially more
polarized than politics: sporting events, specifically college football. College football rivalries are ripe for high levels
of attachment – college football fans are emotionally involved in rivalries (Tyler and Cobbs 2016), and fans show an
increase in self-esteem when their favorite teams are doing well (Cialdini et al. 1974; Wann 2006). Further, fans
engage in price discrimination in the ultimatum game, offering significantly lower deals to fans of their rivals than
fans of their favorite team (Mills et al. 2018), evidence we build on in our experimental designs below. For sports
fans, attachment to their favorite team is an important, and potent, identity.
This type of context provides two advantages for understanding partisan discrimination’s limits. First, as elaborated
on above, the decision-making context makes one group identity more salient relative to other identities in a person’s
repertoire. This theoretical possibility has some prior empirical support. Michelitch (2015) finds that election
proximity stimulates price discrimination along partisan lines, modifying existing levels of ethnic discrimination. Copartisanship facilitates cooperation among non-coethnics, while the reverse is true for those not identifying with the
same party.
This context also allows individuals to discriminate against the implicated out-group without fear of reprisal. A
frequent explanation for why overt partisan discrimination exists is that no norms govern how partisans should treat
one another (Iyengar and Westwood 2015; Lelkes and Westwood 2017). Pairing partisanship with a context like
college football should thus facilitate comparisons between contentious identities. Out-group derogation is almost
encouraged in the context of college football. Consequently, when individuals are given the opportunity to
discriminate against the opposing team, they will likely take advantage of this chance. However, we can also
investigate whether partisanship moderates these effects. That is, when a fan of an opposing team is known to support
or oppose the political party an individual backs, then reactions to the target can change (Hewstone, Islam, and Judd,
1993; Mullen, Migdal, and Hewstone, 2001). Someone’s partisan affiliation could guide decision-making, or it could
not in a context constructed to emphasize college football allegiances and require no political judgments, at least on
its face.2
Through two studies we address possible partisan discrimination along two dimensions. The first builds on work
investigating partisan biases in economic decision-making (McConnell et al. 2018). In each study, participants make
hypothetical3 decisions about selling tickets for a college football rivalry game to a fictitious individual. We vary the
information provided about this buyer to include cues about which team he supports and with which political party he
aligns. The second relates to interpersonal judgments, a less likely location to find an impact for partisanship because
the context does not necessarily encourage individuals to view our hypothetical ticket buyer any differently. After
making their ticket selling decisions, study participants completed a series of items evaluating the hypothetical buyer.
These additional inferences shed light on the breadth of partisanship’s influence in a context where these concerns
2

It could be that college football fandoms, like other social identities, have political content or are seen as connected with a political party either
directly or through their connection to other social groups (e.g., class, region) that are perceived as comprising each political party (Ahler and Sood
2018). College football may thus not actually be orthogonal to politics. Even so, we find little evidence in our two studies that college football
fandom and partisanship are closely related. In Study 1, while Democrats and Republicans are about equally likely to be Alabama fans as Auburn
fans (χ2, p = .052), partisanship is weakly correlated with feeling thermometer ratings for fans from each school (Alabama = .092, Auburn = -.072),
as well as identification as a school football fan (.097). In Study 2, we find stronger but still low correlations between partisanship and school
ratings (Boise State = .21; Nevada = .13), as well as team attachment (.15). Measures are described in footnote 6.
3
While this is a hypothetical decision, individuals often behave similarly in hypothetical decision making as they do in real decision making.
Especially when the potential payoff is small, or if the gamble is framed in terms of gains, rather than losses (as in our study), behavior in
hypothetical and real economic decisions are indistinguishable (Kuhberger et al. 2002).
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should carry less weight, revealing it to be specific to the ticket selling, or potentially broader. In the same apolitical
context, we can thus speak to both whether partisan concerns guide people’s economic decisions and also if they shape
the impressions people form about those with whom they interact.
Study 1: Partisan Discrimination Among Alabama and Auburn Fans
Our first study focuses on an unlikely place to uncover partisan bias with respect to college sports: the football rivalry
between Alabama and Auburn. This is a contentious annual matchup, referred to as the “Iron Bowl,” that sports
analysts consistently rank as one of the top ten rivalries, in any sport, of the 20th century in North America. Tommy
Bowden, a former assistant coach at both Alabama and Auburn, summed up the intensity of the rivalry, saying, “the
one thing you do have when you're coaching Alabama, you obviously have a strong hatred for Auburn and vice versa.” 4
Interactions between fans offer some additional indication about the rivalry’s seriousness. Sometimes this involves
lighthearted pranks, like Auburn fans taping a jersey of former Auburn quarterback Cam Newton on the statue of
longtime Alabama coach Bear Bryant.5 But at other times it’s more serious. A particularly noteworthy example
occurred in 2010. Alabama fan Harvey Updyke Jr. poisoned the trees on Auburn’s Toomer’s Corner, where Auburn
fans celebrate the team’s wins (and Alabama’s losses), as retribution for Auburn winning the Iron Bowl. As the poison
acted slowly, the culprit, and the act itself, went unknown until Updyke called in to a radio show two months later to
brag about the incident, closing his call with Alabama’s trademark slogan “Roll Tide!”. 6 Updyke received prison time
and a substantial fine, and trees are still struggling to grow on Toomer’s Corner.
Study 1 relies a survey experiment conducted on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (mturk) in October and November, 2016.
The study recruited participants who self-identify as Alabama or Auburn football fans.7 After answering a screening
question to verify that they were fans of Alabama or Auburn, participants completed a study that took roughly 5
minutes in exchange for a payment of 75 cents. A total of 2016 subjects participated over 2 rounds, the first beginning
on October 31, 2016, and the second beginning on November 14, 2016. 8 Each round was fielded in the week prior to
the contests relevant for each affiliation as a moderating effect: the 2016 presidential election for round 1 and the Iron
Bowl for round 2. In doing so, we attempted to leverage proximity to competition as a moderating variable but found
no such effects. 9
While this is a convenience sample, there is considerable variation on observed demographics. The age of participants
ranged from 18 to 77, with a mean value of about 32. Sixty-two percent of the sample was male, and 78% of the
sample was white. As is common in mturk samples (e.g., Berinsky et al. 2012)10, the sample was highly educated,
with about 52.5% holding a Bachelor’s degree or higher. There was geographic distribution of our sample, though
over 21% of subjects live in Alabama. Roughly 45% of the sample identified as Republican, 42% Democrat, and 13%
pure independents. Alabama fans were more heavily represented, with 74% of the sample identifying as an Alabama
fan, and only 26% identifying as an Auburn fan.
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We appreciate that mturk users could have satisficed about their team fandom to gain access to the survey. However, we think that individuals
with no team attachment would simply add some statistical noise to our study, especially given that they would be equally likely to be randomly
assigned to any experimental group. We made a few efforts to measure team attachment. First, we scale together two questions, asked prior to
treatment, to determine the strength of team attachment (Leach et al. 2008), “Being a [Alabama/Auburn] fan is an important part of how I see
myself” and “Identifying with other [Alabama/Auburn] fans is central to who I am as an individual.” These questions had a sample mean of .62
(s.d = .25) on a 0-1 scale, indicating some strength of identification. Further, we asked all respondents (again, pre -treatment) to rate both Alabama
and Auburn on a feeling thermometer. On average, respondents rated their favorite team nearly 50 points higher (49.89, s.d = 34.82) than the rival
team. Only 6.65% of the sample rated the rival team higher, and another 3.03% rated them the same. While these are only self-reports, we think
this indicates a relatively strong team attachment, on average, in our sample – one that is higher than the levels of team attachment for undergraduate
students in Study 2.
8
Data collection for round 1 took 5 days to complete, while collection for Round 2 took 6 days.
9
It is possible that this occurred due to the surprising nature of the election. We predicted that partisanship would be salient in the week prior to
the election, and that team attachment would be salient in the week prior to the Iron Bowl. However, given that Donald Trump won the election in
a surprise (winning the Electoral College by a substantial margin, but losing the popular vote by a substantial margin), part isan loyalties may have
remained heightened in the weeks after the election more than we would have expected. Indeed, Michelitch and Utych (2018) show that, as an
election becomes more proximate, partisan attachment tends to increase, and this is true whether the election is approaching or retreating. All results
presented in this paper are robust to including a control for the round of the survey, which is not depicted for brevity.
10
And perhaps more so in our study, as we specifically recruited fans of college football teams.
5
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During the study, participants first answered a series of demographic questions. They were then exposed to the
experimental treatment. All subjects received a brief introduction to the text, describing a scenario where they are
attempting to sell tickets to the upcoming Iron Bowl game between Alabama and Auburn on craigslist. The text of
this introduction reads:
Please read the following scenario:
Imagine you spent $2000 on 4 tickets to this year’s Iron Bowl in Tuscaloosa. These tickets are in
the lower bowl of the stadium at the 50 yard line. You and a friend are planning to go, but the people
using your other two tickets are unable to attend. You have a friend that would like to go, but cannot
afford to pay you anything for the tickets. Instead, you have decided to list the pair of unused tickets
on Craigslist for $1000 to recover the cost.
It is November 22, 4 days before the Iron Bowl, and you have yet to receive a serious offer for your
tickets. Imagine you get the following email inquiring about the tickets. Remember that the person
you sell the tickets to will be seated next to you at the game.
After reading this introductory text, subjects were then assigned to one of four experimental conditions. In these
conditions, subjects received a mock email from James Anderson offering to buy the tickets at a price lower than the
asking price. In the control group, James did not provide information in the email about his team or partisan affiliation.
In the team only condition, James provided information that he was a graduate of the school that participants indicated
they were not a fan of. 11 In the Republican condition, James included information that he works for the Republican
Party, in addition to the team information, while in the Democrat condition, James indicated that he works for the
Democratic Party. Full treatment texts are available in Appendix A. 12
James’s team affiliation was intentionally held constant to ensure a difficult test for partisan discrimination. In the
partisan treatments, James is always identified as a fan of the other team. 13 This provides participants with an easy
way to discriminate against James – since they have to sit next to him at the game, they should be more concerned
about sitting near a fan of the other team. Essentially, James’s team affiliation will almost certainly be salient at the
game, while his partisan affiliation may or may not matter in an individual’s decision-making.
The partisan treatments were recoded to allow for variation in participant partisanship. The out-partisan treatment was
coded as 1 if the subject identified as a Democrat[Republican] and James identified as a Republican[Democrat]. The
co-partisan treatment, conversely, was coded as 1 if the subject identified as a Democrat[Republican] and James
identified as a Democrat[Republican]. 14 In comparing the partisan treatments, we compute a treatment variable,
partisan, coded as 1 for the co-partisan treatment and 0 for the out-partisan treatment.
Our design thus allows us to test the following hypotheses, drawn from the literature on partisan discrimination and
work on social identity theory:
1a. Relative to the control, incorporating information on the football team James is a fan of will result in
greater discrimination over ticket selling and prices.
1b. Relative to the control, incorporating information on the football team James is a fan of will result in
more negative judgments of James as an individual.
2a. Relative to the team only condition, incorporating information on James’s partisanship will result in
greater discrimination over ticket selling and prices among non-copartisans.

11

That is, Alabama fans were informed that James was an Auburn graduate and Auburn fans were informed that James was an Alabama graduate.
Additionally, treatments varied the price of James’s offer between $600 and $800 to address reactions to offer amounts seen as more or less
credible. There were no moderating effects of the initial offer in any analyses.
13
This also reflects some evidence that partisanship may shape behavior only toward out-group members in the decision-making context (Michelitch
2015).
14
Pure independents were always coded as the treatment being out-partisan, since pure independents are unlikely to share a social identity with
either partisan group.
12
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2b. Relative to the team only condition, incorporating information on James’s partisanship will result in
more negative judgments of James as an individual among non-copartisans.
3a. Relative to the team only condition, incorporating information on James’s partisanship will result in less
discrimination over ticket selling and prices among co-partisans.
3b. Relative to the team only condition, incorporating information on James’s partisanship will result in
more positive judgments of James as an individual among co-partisans.
Results
We start by considering the potential for partisan price discrimination by partisan treatment condition. As Table 1
demonstrates, co-partisans are more generous to James when selling their ticket. First, participants were asked whether
they would accept James’s offer, make a counter-offer, or not reply to his email. Column 1 of Table 1 15 identifies the
likelihood that participants will accept James’s initial offer. When James is a co-partisan, subjects are roughly 6
percentage points more likely to accept his offer in the $600 treatment, and about 9 percentage points more likely to
accept his offer in the $800 treatment, compared to when James is an out-partisan.
Table 1. Price Discrimination (Co-Partisan vs. Out-Partisan)

Co-Partisan
Treatment
$800 Price
Treatment
Constant
N
(Pseudo) R2

Sell Ticket

Minimum Price

Counter Offer Price

0.37**
(0.14)
0.88***
(0.14)
-1.45***
(0.13)
971
0.0375

-67.07**
(26.60)
107.14***
(26.33)
822.25***
(21.56)
971
0.0230

-43.92**
(20.59)
125.25***
(20.47)
900.03***
(15.50)
571
0.0678

Table Entries are Logit (Column 1) or OLS (Columns 2 and 3) coefficients with standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Participants were also asked the lowest price they would accept16 from James for their tickets. Once again, we observe
partisan discrimination. When James is a co-partisan, participants are likely to ask for about $67 less for the tickets,
at minimum, compared to when he is an out-partisan. Those who volunteered that they would make a counter offer to
James were asked what price they would propose in a counter. This counter-offering group also engaged in partisan
price discrimination, with those in the co-partisan treatment proposing a counter price about $44 lower than those in
the out-partisan treatment. These findings suggest that partisan price discrimination is occurring, but they do not
indicate whether subjects are favoring co-partisans, punishing out-partisans, or both. To address this, we turn to the
full sample, with results presented in Figures 1 and 2.17

15

Results are robust to a multinomial logit model with all choices left at their initial values. In column 1, the dependent variable is coded as 1 if the
participant agrees to accept James’s offer, and 0 for any other response.
16
This variable was smoothed to allow any minimum price (including one of $500,000) to take a maximum value of $3000, or three times the initial
asking price. A total of 21 respondents volunteered a minimum price of greater than $3000. Results are robust to setting a threshold of $1000 or
$5000 for smoothing.
17
Full regression models of these analyses, and all analyses presented only graphically in text, are available in the Online Appendix.
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Figure 1: Probability of Accepting Offer
Predicted probabilities by treatment condition with 95%
confidence intervals. Full results in Appendix B.

Counter Offer

Co-Partisan

Out-Partisan

No Cue

Team Cue Only

Figure 2. Lowest and Counter Offer Prices
Marginal effects by treatment condition with 95%
confidence intervals. Full results in Appendix B.

We see, unsurprisingly, that those in the control group are more willing to accept the initial offer, and offer a lower
price, than those in the team only treatment group – that is, price discrimination occurs based on the team cue,
supporting H1a. These results are presented graphically in Figures 1 and 2. However, additional examination suggests
an interesting result when it comes to the co-partisan and out-partisan treatments. Those in the out-partisan treatment
are statistically indistinguishable from the team only treatment group in their likelihood of selling the ticket, and the
price they offer for the ticket. However, in the co-partisan treatment, subjects are more likely to sell their ticket to
James (p < .05), offer a lower minimum price (p < .10), and offer a lower counter-offer price (p < .05), when they
choose to counter, than those receiving only the team cue. This suggests that while partisan discrimination is occurring
among Alabama and Auburn fans when selling Iron Bowl tickets, this discrimination functions as co-partisan in-group
favoritism that displaces James supporting the opposing team. Adding information that an individual works for the
out-party, however, does not seem to have any impact on price on top of the effect already exhibited by team based
price discrimination. Partisan in-group favoritism appears to matter more than out-group hostility in this context,
evidence supporting H3a and not H2a.
Individuals still discriminate based on partisanship even when the context suggests it should not matter; party guides
one’s willingness to sell tickets to the Iron Bowl and desire to offer a low price for those tickets. However, participants
may draw other inferences about James, our hypothetical ticket buyer. As noted above, interpersonal evaluations offer
insights into the scope of partisan discrimination. If partisanship only bears on the ticket selling decision, then partisan
discrimination is limited to the task the context emphasizes. But if it also contributes to evaluations, then attachments
to an identity less relevant to the present context can have secondary consequences. To assess these possibilities, we
turn to an analysis measuring beliefs about James, including preferred social distance and trust.
After responding with their ticket sale preferences participants answered a modified version of the Bogardus Social
Distance scale (1947). This measure is traditionally used to measure a desire for social distance from an individual or
group. Here, we asked participants to rate their agreement or disagreement 18 with three statements from the scale.
These statements were “I would be happy if James lived in my community,” “I would be happy if James lived next
door to me,” and “I would be happy if James married into my family.” We combined these items into an additive scale
(Cronbach’s α = .86), recoded to run 0 – 1, with 1 indicating the highest desire for social distance and 0 indicating the
lowest desire for social distance.
We focus on trust because it is a core positive in-group evaluation and should thus be most responsive to groupspecific evaluations (Brewer 1999). To measure trust, we ask participants to respond to two statements. 19 The first
asks “I would trust James to watch my things if I went to the restroom during the game” and “If I gave James money
to buy concessions for me, I am sure he would give me back the correct change.” We combine these two items into
18
19

On a five-point scale, from Strongly Agree to Strongly Disagree, allowing for a neutral midpoint.
Agreement with these statements is also measured on a five-point scale from Strong Agree to Strongly Disagree.
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an additive trust index (Cronbach’s α = .71), scaled from 0-1, with 0 indicating the least amount of interpersonal trust,
and 1 indicating the highest amount. We present results in Table 3 comparing these outcomes between the co-partisan
and out-partisan treatments.
The results suggest that the co-partisan treatment, compared to the out-partisan treatment, seems to influence desire
both social distance and trust. Compared to out-partisans, co-partisans desire less social distance from James (p <
.05), and are more likely to trust James than out-partisans (p < .10). These effects are small, but meaningful in at least
the first case (Cohen’s d = .20 and .11).20 They suggest that partisanship not only influences economic decisions, but
may also influence perceptions of the person with whom subjects engage in the economic transaction. To further
examine these differences, we again turn to an analysis of the full sample, as presented graphically in Figure 3.
Table 2. Social Distance and Trust (Co-Partisan vs. Out-Partisan)

Social Distance
-0.045***
(0.013)
-0.017
(0.013)
0.488***
(0.011)
971
0.0138

Co-Partisan Treatment
$800 Price Treatment
Constant
N
R2

Trust
0.027*
(0.016)
0.022
(0.016)
0.554***
(0.013)
971
0.0049

Table entries are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
0.65

0.6
0.55
0.5

0.45
0.4
0.35
Social Distance
Co-Partisan

Trust

Out-Partisan

No Cue

Team Cue Only

Figure 3. Social Distance and Trust
Marginal effects by treatment condition with 95% confidence
intervals. Full results in Appendix B.
These results suggest that the treatments operate a bit differently with regard to personal evaluations, compared to
economic transactions. While in the economic decision models, the co-partisan treatment served to mute team-based
discrimination and the out-partisan treatment had no effect, we observe different results here. For social distance, it
appears that co-partisans desire less social distance to James, compared to the team only cue, while out-partisans feel
more social distance. Note too that these effects, while small (about 2% of the scale of the variable), rival the difference
between the control and team only conditions.21 While significant results do not hold for trust, results for the coCohen’s d values near .20 denote small but meaningful effects (Cohen 1992).
Differences between the co-partisan treatment and the control are insignificant (F = 0.17, p > .10). Moreover, standardized effect sizes (Cohen’s
d) are near .13.
20
21
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partisan treatment approach statistical significance (p ~ .16), and are larger than the effect of the team only treatment,
compared to the control. This suggests that partisan discrimination may rival the effect of team-based discrimination
(seemingly more relevant for this decision task) in terms of inferences about another individual, but these results only
offer mixed support for H1b, H2b, and H3b.
Additional results suggest that partisan discrimination in interpersonal judgments is not all-encompassing. Participants
were asked to rate their agreement with the statement “I believe James would be respectful if [Alabama/Auburn] won
the game,” and no differences 22 emerged between the co-partisan and out-partisan treatment on this measure (p =
.50). Subjects were also asked to rate James’s seriousness as a fan, and his knowledge of college football. Again, no
differences emerged between the co-partisan and out-partisan treatment groups (p = .97 and .26, respectively). Outpartisans and co-partisans also did not differ in a willingness to tease James after the game if their favorite team won
(p = .48). Co-partisans do appear slightly more likely to be willing to tailgate with James before the game than outpartisans (β = .031, p = .11), though this relationship disappears when the full sample is analyzed.
Taken together, these results suggest that partisanship can influence attitudes and behaviors, even when another, more
relevant option for discrimination is offered. Compared to out-partisans, co-partisans offer better ticket prices to, desire
less social distance from, and have more trust in a fan of their rival team. However, these differences do not appear to
extend to other inferences about the individual or to direct confrontational actions such as teasing. Party matters, but
its influence is confined and appears most related to the decision emphasized by the context. However, Study 1
provides us only a single test of our predictions – Study 1 occurs in a high intensity rivalry, and our design relies on
self-identified fans. Further, the fandom of the prospective ticket buyer in Study 1 never varies – other than in the
control group, the buyer is always portrayed as a fan of the opposing team. To address these concerns, we turn to
another study, one where fandom does not need to be self-identified and where we vary the fandom of the prospective
ticket buyer experimentally.
Study 2: Partisan Discrimination at Boise State University
We further assess partisan discrimination by exploring a less contentious college football rivalry: Boise State and
Nevada. Relative to the high frequency Alabama-Auburn matchup, the Boise-Nevada game had been inactive for two
seasons prior to the fall 2017 study. Additionally, going into the game, which Boise State won overwhelmingly, Boise
State was in the midst of a strong, though slightly disappointing, season with a 6-2 record, while Nevada was struggling
with a 1-7 record. Given that there was little reason to believe the game would be especially competitive, and that
Boise State was heavily favored to win, individuals may not feel a need to discriminate against fans of the other team.
In this study, we rely on an experiment conducted in October and November 2017 as part of an omnibus study of
undergraduates at Boise State University. Participants were recruited from a variety of courses, though mainly political
science courses, and were offered extra credit to complete the study. Participants read a vignette similar to that used
for Study 1 but focused on the upcoming football game vs. Nevada. Here, we are able to examine participants with a
single team-based identity, Boise State, while keeping electoral concerns distant.23 As such, we use a 2x2 experiment
where participants are told they have tickets to sell, and receive an email offering a lower price for these tickets. Here,
and in contrast to Study 1, we vary the team affiliation of the person contacting them (Boise State or Nevada) as well
as their partisanship (Republican or Democrat). The text received by participants is as follows:
Imagine you have 4 tickets to this year’s Boise State vs. Nevada game on November 4 th, 2017 at
Albertson’s Stadium. Since some friends planned to come from out of town to attend the game with
you, you purchased tickets in the 5th row at the 50 yard line. However, only one of your friends can
attend the game, so you must find people to use the other two tickets. You have a friend who will
take the tickets for free, but is unable to pay you for the tickets. To recover your money, you have
decided to list the pair of tickets for $200 on craigslist.

22

Full results for these models are available in Appendix B.
Indeed, per Michelitch and Utych (2018), early November in a non-election year seems to be the time when partisan loyalties are generally least
intense.
23
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It is November 1, 4 days before the game, and you have yet to receive a serious offer for your tickets.
Imagine you get the following email inquiring about the tickets. Remember that the person you sell
the tickets to will be seated next to you at the game.
Hello –
My name is Jake Stewart and I am interested in purchasing your tickets to the Boise State / Nevada
game. I moved to Montana to work for the Montana [Republican/Democratic] Party after
graduating from [Boise State/University of Nevada], but will be in Boise with a friend for the game
this weekend. We are huge [BSU/Nevada] football fans, and have already been to three games this
season. We do not currently have tickets and are very interested in your seats. I can offer you a total
of $100 for the tickets, and can pick them up from you any time Friday or Saturday.
[Go Broncos!/Go Wolfpack!],
Jake Stewart
Operations Director, Montana [Republican/Democratic] Party
[Boise State / University of Nevada-Reno] Class of 2015
Participants then answered similar questions about their willingness to accept, counter, or not reply to Jake’s 24
purchase offer, the lowest price they would accept for the tickets. They also rated Jake on a host of measures. Copartisanship is measured by shared partisanship with Jake, including leaners. As in Study 1, pure independents are
coded as out-partisans, due to a lack of shared identity with either partisan group. Figures 4 and 5 provide the effects
of each shared identity, partisanship and team, on willingness to sell the ticket and the minimum price requested. 25
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85
75

0.6
0.5
0.4

0.3
0.2
0.1
0
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Social
Distance

Co-Partisan

Trust

Lowest Price
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Figure 4. Accepting Offer, Social Distance, and Trust
Predicted probabilities by treatment condition for
“Accept Offer” and marginal effects by treatment
condition for Social Distance and Trust. Each with 95%
confidence intervals, one-tailed. Full results in
Appendix B.

Counter Offer

Out-Partisan

Figure 5. Minimum Price and Counter Offer Price
Marginal effects by treatment condition with 95%
confidence intervals. Full results in Appendix B.

Once again, patterns of partisan discrimination emerge. When an individual requesting to buy the ticket is a copartisan, individuals are more likely to accept his initial offer, by about 11 percentage points (p < .05), and demand a
slightly lower price, by over $9 (p < .1). Among those who made a counter-offer for the tickets, co-partisans were
again offered a lower price, by over $13 (p < .05). Interestingly, these effects do not emerge based on team identity,
except that Boise State students are willing to offer a lower minimum price, by over $10, to other Boise State fans, an
effect similar in magnitude to partisan discrimination. This is perhaps because Boise State and Nevada have a less
24

Additionally, since we were worried that James Anderson from North Carolina may give off a racial, rather than purely partisan, cue, we have
changed the name to a more obvious white name, Jake Stewart from Montana.
25
Individuals requesting more than the original $200 amount had their minimum offer price set at $200 in this analysis.
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intense rivalry than Alabama and Auburn, and 2017 marked the first time they had played in 3 years due to conference
realignment. Still, individuals engage in discrimination based on party, and appear to engage in this discrimination
both by favoring co-partisans and by punishing out-partisans. Next, we turn to a similar analysis of trust and social
distance, as conducted in Study 1. These results are presented graphically in Figure 4.
The social distance scale and trust scales are created from the same measures as Study 1. 26 Here, we see that individuals
prefer slightly more social distance, about 5% of the scale, towards an out-partisan, compared to a co-partisan (p <
.05). Interestingly, this result operates in the opposite direction expected for the Boise State treatment, with participants
desiring greater social distance from a Boise State fan than a Nevada fan, though this effect does not reach statistical
significance. No effects are demonstrated for trust on either co-partisanship or shared team identity, in contrast to
small findings in Study 1.
As in Study 1, these effects do not appear to extend to other areas, with individuals rating Jake’s level of fandom (5.14
as a co-partisan, 5.12 as an out-partisan, p = .91) and their desire to watch the game with him (4.47 as a co-partisan,
4.55 as an out-partisan, p = .59) similarly across each treatment group. They do rate his knowledge marginally
differently across groups, but here they rate out-partisan knowledge as higher than co-partisan knowledge (4.84 vs.
5.03, p= .18, two-tailed). In sum, the results from Study 2 largely comport with the results from Study 1. Partisanship
shapes preferences for selling football tickets. It also extends into interpersonal evaluations, but only for desired social
distance from the individual buying the tickets. This occurs even in an atmosphere where partisanship is unlikely to
cue other concerns or identities, and the football game is temporally proximate, while an election is temporally distant.
In this study, partisanship’s effects surpass the null effects for team-based discrimination. The lower salience rivalry
could explain these effects. Likewise, many students in this sample were enrolled in Freshman courses, perhaps
meaning they had not developed a strong affinity with Boise State by the time of the study. 27
Conclusion
Taken together, these results provide further evidence that partisanship provides a potent force in American social life.
Even in the scenario of a college football game, a context where another identity should drive preferences, individuals
tend to view economic decisions through a partisans lens, with some evidence this extends even to judgments of the
person with whom they interact. Partisan price discrimination and interpersonal social distance and trust judgments
occur despite a context emphasizing football team attachments, rather than partisanship, as the most relevant group
identity. Even when individuals are presented with a different, and more relevant, group identity upon which to
discriminate, they continue to discriminate based on partisanship.
That being said, the pattern of discrimination is interesting. Our results do not suggest that partisans will discriminate
more against out-partisans in a competitive context. Rather, they suggest partisanship can provide a shared identity
that overcomes intergroup conflict in a given context. Even so, design choices may underpin this conclusion.
Individuals may discriminate against out partisans when these individuals also do not share the same team attachments,
and social identity theory suggests these double out-group individuals are punished most (Mullen, Migdal, and
Hewstone 2001). While partisan out-group cues appear more influential in shaping individuals’ attitudes and behaviors
(Nicholson 2012; Westfall et al 2015; Davis 2018), our designs do not allow us to assess this possibility with certainty.
We sought to create a context deemphasizing partisanship, not look at the full cross of group dynamics in an apolitical
setting. Study 2 does cross partisanship and potential buyer fandom, and while we do not find any additional
punishment for a double out-group prospective ticket buyer, we lack sufficient power to confidently make these
comparisons. But despite these concerns about whether the direction of partisan discrimination consistently points one
way, our results are consistent with recent work suggesting that partisan discrimination results mostly from in-group
favoritism rather than from a desire to punish members of the out-party (Lelkes and Westwood 2017, see also
McConnell et al. 2018). We complement these insights by finding a similar effect in a different setting, one
encouraging decision-making on a non-partisan basis.

Cronbach’s α = .85 for the 3 social distance questions, and only .47 for the 2 trust questions. Each scale is recoded to run 0-1.
Indeed, team attachment is weaker in our Boise State sample than among Alabama and Auburn fans. We modify the two team identity attachment
items for the present context: “Being a Boise State fan is an important part of how I see myself” and “Identifying with other Boise State fans is
central to who I am as an individual.” Responses were recorded on a 4-point Likert scale, ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree, with no
midpoint response, and recoded from 0 to 1, with 1 indicating strong identification. The mean value was .36 (s.d. = .32), demonstrating an overall
low attachment. By comparison, similar questions in Study 1 indicated a substantially stronger attachment to teams from Alabama and Auburn
fans, with a mean of .62 (s.d. = .25).
26
27
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This research has implications for scholars of partisanship, polarization, and group identity. In an era of increasing
polarization, it appears that partisan attitudes shape individual level decision-making, even in a context constructed to
deemphasize partisan concerns. Additionally, it appears that partisanship’s predictive power as a group identity can
rival or surpass that of college football team attachment. Even when partisanship is not heightened, partisans will
demonstrate classic group dynamics of rewarding co-partisans.
These results also suggest that in today’s contentious and party-centric political context partisanship is a chronically
salient identity. Much like closely held attitudes, deeply ingrained identities can dominate other attachments, shaping
attitudes and behaviors across contexts (Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje 2002). Context then carries less weight in
shaping when people think in partisan terms. This may follow from the increased alignment between individuals’
social and political selves (Mason 2018). Alternatively, these patterns may simply follow from the frequency with
which people evaluate politics through partisan lenses relative to other attachments (Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje
2002), placing partisanship above other attachments for making sense of affairs, political or otherwise. Regardless of
the reason why, our results speak to the ease with which individuals use their partisan lenses to view the world around
them. Even in an area where politics should not reign supreme, we find that one favors their own partisan group, to
the point where this mitigates discrimination caused by one being a fan of the opposing team. Therefore, in areas
where partisanship is the only salient identity (such as, say, choosing whether or not to let someone with a partisan
bumper sticker merge into traffic), we expect that partisan discrimination will be even stronger.
Our results suggest that the mere mention of partisan attachment is sufficient for it to shape outcomes in nonpolitical
settings, but the question remains whether partisanship matters in areas where it is not mentioned at all. While context
provides information about which identit(ies) should matter (Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje 2002), the activation of an
identity related to partisanship could result in also activating partisan attachments without any mention of a political
party or emphasis on political decision. But if the context is not political, nor any mention made of partisanship, then
it seems less likely that these attachments, even if deeply held and easily activated, will shape behavior. Future work,
then, could consider whether activating partisan-aligned identities like class, race, and religion in an apolitical decision
context (e.g., selling an item on an online marketplace like ebay or Craigslist) also leads to partisanship being activated
through a process like spreading activation (Collins and Loftus 1975) and thus partisan ties also explain measured
outcomes. Considering additional contexts, judgments, or pairings of the two can help uncover what leads partisanship
to affect decisions in apolitical contexts, even dominating other potentially deeply held but apolitical identities, and
when these dynamics have limits.
This research is not without limitations. First, it is important to consider the relative strength of partisan discrimination
compared to other important identities. As we note, work could consider identities such as religious, ethnic, or regional
simultaneously with partisanship to further demonstrate partisan discrimination’s pervasiveness. Further, we focus
only on behavioral intentions rather than decisions that contain material consequences. While we believe our results
tell us something important and interesting about the nature of partisanship’s influence, future field experimental work
could study partisan discrimination in actual market price bargaining (e.g., Riach and Rich 2002; Michelitch 2015),
contributing to evidence that partisan loyalties may have economic consequences (McConnell et al. 2018). We are
also limited by the design of the studies – in Study 1, we do not vary the fandom of the prospective buyer. While we
do so in Study 2, this occurs in a context of considerably lower team attachment and a lower intensity rivalry. As such,
we cannot make strong conclusions about how multiple shared identities may operate together and hope to see this
developed in future work.
Understanding the dynamics of partisan discrimination matters greatly if scholars identify these biases as meeting, or
surpassing, those produced by race (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012; Iyengar and Westwood 2015). But while partisan
attachments are certainly potent, the evidence here and in other work should qualify these claims. That partisan bias
appears to function more as in-group favoritism than out-group hostility suggests that unequal outcomes based on
party attachment, while normatively troubling, are perhaps less dire when considered in light of histories of racial
oppression and violence in the United States (Acharya, Blackwell, and Sen 2018). Further, that partisanship does not
dominate judgments writ large in apolitical contexts is informative when considered alongside the breadth with which
racial considerations shape attitudes and behaviors (Allport 1979; Eberhardt and Goff 2004). While race may serve as
a helpful touchstone for understanding intergroup attitudes, clarity on the nature of partisan and racial animus can
shed light on where this work does or does not relate.
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Ethical approval: “All procedures performed in studies involving human participants were in accordance with the
ethical standards of the institutional and/or national research committee and with the 1964 Helsinki declaration and
its later amendments or comparable ethical standards.”
Informed consent: “Informed consent was obtained from all individual participants included in the study.”
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Appendix A. Study 1 Treatment Texts
Control
Hello –
My name is James Anderson and I am interested in purchasing your tickets to the Iron Bowl. I
recently graduated college and moved to North Carolina, but will be in Tuscaloosa with a friend for
the game this weekend. We haven’t missed the game in the last four years. We do not currently have
tickets and are very interested in your seats. I can offer you a total of [$600/$800] for the tickets,
and can pick them up from you any time Friday or Saturday.
Best,
James Anderson
Team Only
Hello –
My name is James Anderson and I am interested in purchasing your tickets to the Iron Bowl. I
recently graduated from Auburn and moved to North Carolina, but will be in Tuscaloosa with a
friend for the game this weekend. We haven’t missed the game in the last four years. We do not
currently have tickets and are very interested in your seats. I can offer you a total of [$600/$800] for
the tickets, and can pick them up from you any time Friday or Saturday.
War Eagle!
James Anderson
Auburn University Class of 2014
Republican
Hello –
My name is James Anderson and I am interested in purchasing your tickets to the Iron Bowl. I
recently graduated from Auburn and moved to North Carolina to work for the North Carolina
Republican Party, but will be in Tuscaloosa with a friend for the game this weekend. We haven’t
missed the game in the last four years. We do not currently have tickets and are very interested in
your seats. I can offer you a total of [$600/$800] for the tickets, and can pick them up from you any
time Friday or Saturday.
War Eagle!
James Anderson
Outreach coordinator, North Carolina Republican Party
Auburn University Class of 2014
Democrat
Hello –
My name is James Anderson and I am interested in purchasing your tickets to the Iron Bowl. I
recently graduated from Auburn and moved to North Carolina to work for the North Carolina
Democratic Party, but will be in Tuscaloosa with a friend for the game this weekend. We haven’t
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missed the game in the last four years. We do not currently have tickets and are very interested in
your seats. I can offer you a total of [$600/$800] for the tickets, and can pick them up from you any
time Friday or Saturday.
War Eagle!
James Anderson
Outreach coordinator, North Carolina Democratic Party
Auburn University Class of 2014
Appendix B. Supplemental Analyses
Table B1. Price Discrimination (Full Sample), Study 1

Co-Partisan
Treatment
Out-Partisan
Treatment
Control Group
$800 Price
Treatment
Constant
N
R2

Sell Ticket
0.36**
(0.14)
-0.01
(0.14)
0.28**
(0.14)
1.01***
(0.10)
-1.52***
(0.12)
2016
0.0449

Minimum Price
-45.14*
(25.64)
21.75
(23.79)
-80.00***
(24.18)
84.67***
(17.42)
811.35***
(19.52)
2016
0.0223

Counter Offer Price
-45.24**
(19.90)
-1.83
(17.94)
-51.52***
(18.15)
106.48***
(13.36)
909.51***
(14.42)
1215
0.0618

Table Entries are Logit (Column 1) or OLS (Columns 2 and 3) coefficients with standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table B2. Social Distance and Trust (Full Sample), Study 1

Co-Partisan Treatment
Out-Partisan Treatment
Control Group
$800 Price Treatment
Constant
N
R2

Social Distance
-0.024*
(0.013)
0.021*
(0.012)
-0.029**
(0.012)
-0.015*
(0.009)
0.466***
(0.010)
2016
0.0121

Table entries are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Trust
0.023
(0.016)
-0.004
(0.015)
-0.002
(0.015)
0.008
(0.011)
0.565***
(0.012)
2016
0.0020

This is an author-produced, peer-reviewed version of this article. The final, definitive version of this document can be found online at Political
Behavior, published by Springer. Copyright restrictions may apply. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-018-09519-4

Table B3. Price Discrimination (Partisan and Team Identity), Study 2

Co-Partisan
Treatment
Boise State
Treatment
Constant
N
(Pseudo) R2

Sell Ticket
0.49**
(0.29)
0.05
(0.29)
-0.82***
(0.26)
205
0.0106

Minimum Price
-9.08*
(6.87)
-10.33*
(6.87)
114.94***
(5.88)
205
0.0190

Counter Offer Price
-13.18**
(6.51)
2.18
(6.49)
151.77***
(5.48)
108
0.0397

Table Entries are Logit (Column 1) or OLS (Columns 2 and 3) coefficients with standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, one-tailed
Table B4. Social Distance and Trust (Partisan and Team Identity), Study 2

Co-Partisan Treatment
Boise State Treatment
Constant
N
R2

Social Distance
-0.05***
(0.02)
0.03
(0.02)
0.46***
(0.02)
203
0.0445

Table entries are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, one-tailed
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Trust
-0.01
(0.03)
0.02
(0.03)
0.54***
(0.02)
203
0.0021

This is an author-produced, peer-reviewed version of this article. The final, definitive version of this document can be found online at Political Behavior, published by Springer.
Copyright restrictions may apply. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-018-09519-4

Table B5. Actions towards and Perceptions of Buyer (Co-Partisan vs. Out-Partisan), Study 1

Co-Partisan
Treatment
$800 Price
Treatment
Constant
N
R2

Respectful

Serious Fan

Knowledgeable

0.012
(0.018)
0.043**
(0.018)
0.550***
(0.015)
971
0.0063

0.001
(0.014)
0.003
(0.014)
0.813***
(0.011)
971
0.0001

0.015
(0.013)
-0.003
(0.013)
0.728***
(0.011)
971
0.0013

Likelihood of
Teasing
0.016
(0.022)
-0.013
(0.022)
0.420***
(0.018)
971
0.0009

Willingness to
Tailgate
0.031
(0.019)
0.016
(0.019)
0.288***
(0.015)
971
0.0034

Likelihood of
Teasing
-0.028
(0.022)
-0.044**
(0.021)
-0.103***
(0.021)
-0.036**
(0.015)
0.475***
(0.017)
2016
0.0150

Willingness to
Tailgate
0.006
(0.020)
-0.024
(0.018)
0.075***
(0.019)
0.016
(0.013)
0.312***
(0.015)
2016
0.0160

Table entries are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table B6. Actions towards and Perceptions of Buyer (Full Sample), Study 1

Co-Partisan
Treatment
Out-Partisan
Treatment
Control Group
$800 Price
Treatment
Constant
N
R2

Respectful

Serious Fan

Knowledgeable

0.008
(0.018)
-0.005
(0.017)
0.064***
(0.017)
0.024**
(0.012)
0.564***
(0.014)
2016
0.0125

-0.011
(0.014)
-0.011
(0.013)
-0.011
(0.013)
0.013
(0.009)
0.820***
(0.010)
2016
0.0016

-0.016
(0.013)
-0.031**
(0.012)
-0.021*
(0.012)
0.004
(0.009)
0.755***
(0.010)
2016
0.0034

Table entries are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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